VoteID 2009 is supported by:
University of Luxembourg
Interdisciplinary Centre for
Security, Reliability and Trust
Laboratory of Algorithmics,
Cryptology and Security
Fonds National de la Recherche Luxembourg
|19:00||Welcoming reception at Art Café (Theatre des Capucins)|
|8:30||Registration opens, coffee+tea|
Election Verifiability in Trustworthy Voting Systems (slides)
Hidden Information: Optimal contracts for undue influence
in E2E voting systems (slides)
Jeremy Clark, Urs Hengartner and Kate Larson.
Ballot Voting for Receipt-Free Online Elections (slides)
Roland Wen and Richard Buckland
and Simplifying a Variant of Pret a Voter (slides)
Ralf Kuesters, Tomasz Truderung and Andreas Vogt
|11:45||Lunch at Tempura|
Graphics on Usability and Accessibility for the
Lana Lowry, Sharon Laskowski and Benjamin Smith
voters' attitudes towards electronic voting in Latin
America: Evidence from Colombia's 2007 e-voting pilot
Michael Alvarez, Gabriel Katz, Hugo Martinez and Ricardo Llamosa
a legal framework for remote electronic voting (slides)
Axel Schmidt, Dennis Heinson, Lucie Langer, Zoi Opitz-Talidou, Philipp Richter, Melanie Volkamer and Johannes Buchmann
a voter verifiable code voting system (slides)
Rui Joaquim, Carlos Ribeiro and Paulo Ferreira
|17:30||City tour (2 hours) (depart from Place Guillaume II)|
|20:00||Conference Dinner at Fourchette à Droite|
Disclosure Counting for the Alternative Vote (slides)
Roland Wen and Richard Buckland
Of Secure Preferential E-Voting (slides)
Kun Peng and Feng Bao
|10:15||Invited lecture: How hard is it to manipulate voting?
Rijnland Internet Election System: a cursory study of published
Rop Gonggrijp, Willem-Jan Hengeveld, Eelco Hotting, Sebastian Schmidt and Frederik Weidemann
electoral traces: the Dutch tempest discussion and
|12:45||Farewell Lunch at Porta Nova|
Election Verifiability in Trustworthy Voting Systems
(joint work with Mounira Kourjieh, Steve Kremer, Ben Smyth)
Election verifiability by voters and observers is essential for engendering public trust of electronic elections. We show how aspects of election verifiability can be formalised, and how those aspects can be evaluated for a range of election systems in the literature. Election verifiability intuitively appears to conflict with coercion resistance; we show that our definition is compatible with our previous definition of coercion resistance and exhibit some systems that satisfy both.
How hard is it to manipulate voting?
(joint work with Edith Elkind)
We address the problem of constructing mechanisms for popular voting that are computationally hard to manipulate. A recent paper by Conitzer and Sandholm shows that one can make many well-known mechanisms resistant to manipulation by prepending them with a pre-round of a certain form. Variants of these technique result in mechanisms that are NP-hard, #P-hard, or PSPACE-hard. We extend this result in several directions.
First, we show that using this approach, one can make manipulation as hard as inverting one-way functions. This hardness criterion is standard in cryptography, and is an important step in achieving average-case hardness.
Second, we introduce a general technique for obtaining a new mechanism by combining two or more base mechanisms, and study the resulting class of hybrid voting mechanisms. We show that the mechanisms of Conitzer and Sandholm can be viewed as a special case of our construction. Moreover, many other mechanisms in this class are also hard to manipulate, and some of them have a combination of desirable properties not shared by previously known manipulation-resistant mechanisms.
Finally, we discuss the limitations of pre-round based mechanisms and show that they cannot be used to achieve some natural average-case hardness goals.